SACRAMENTO, CA - The Supreme Court on Monday held that coordinated expenditures by political parties may be constitutionally limited in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II). This decision has been greeted with enthusiasm by campaign finance reformers. They argue that read along with the Court’s 2000 decision regarding the constitutionality of contribution limits in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC (also authored by Souter), it demonstrates that a majority on the Court stands ready to confirm the constitutionality of broad campaign finance reforms. But their victory dance is premature.

Colorado II affirmed current law, under which parties can spend up to a certain amount of party money in coordination with, and for the benefit of, its candidates in general elections. For example, in 2000, coordinated expenditure limits for House campaigns in 2000 were $33,780, except in states with only one congressional district, where the limit was $67,560. Parties can also spend unlimited amounts independently of their candidates. Independent expenditures can pose logistical trouble for parties, since candidates and parties are naturally closely aligned, and frequently share staff, consultants, and volunteers.

The Colorado Party had argued that since political parties are creations designed to support candidates, party expenditures on behalf of candidates could not be “corrupting” even when coordinated. The majority opinion by Justice Souter (and joined by Justices Stevens, O’Conner, Ginsberg, and Breyer) concluded that since coordinated activities of PACs, individuals, and other political actors may be restricted as “contributions” under Buckley v. Valeo, so should similar expenditures by parties. Unlimited coordinated expenditures could increase the use of party committees to circumvent existing contribution limits, and in Buckley the Court had determined that contribution limits could be applied to prevent circumvention of other limits.

Are Colorado II (and Shrink Missouri) big wins for the reform movement? Not really. Both cases presented the Court with cutting-edge theories and novel arguments. While these arguments had merit, the Court could logically apply Buckley to these cases in a straightforward (and arguably simplistic) manner to arrive at its decisions. The Buckley decision is notorious for its length and disjointedness. What we may now be seeing is that these characteristics render it useful in confirming congressional power to regulate campaign finance when certain questions come before the courts. Who knew that Buckley could become a tool for regulators?

Unlike the issues raised in Shrink Missouri and Colorado II, many campaign reform measures in McCain Feingold/Shays Meehan present clear constitutional problems under Buckley and subsequent cases. Nevertheless, McCain Feingold possesses the same attraction as a Bialystock & Bloom production: the authors can oversubscribe their bill with every pet innovation of every reformer in line, safe in the knowledge that the whole thing is guaranteed to flop--either in conference committee, through a presidential veto, or under judicial scrutiny. The authors can then scamper away, rich with credit as true-blue good-government types, without risk. Remember  this when you read about how the Colorado II defeat has improved the atmosphere for “reform” in Washington.

- Allison Hayward Allison Hayward, PRI’s guest columnist this week, has practiced election law in Washington, D.C. and Sacramento and is the author of Sam’s Teach Yourself ePolitics (Macmillan).